I think Jeffrey has pointed out something very important: ‘Here I am equating “second rate or grade” students with second rate or grade intelligence for purposes of simplifying illustration of argument, which is of course not necessarily true all cases : second rate or grade students may be of superior intelligence uninspired by the particular nature of academic challenge thrusted upon them’. It’s high time for our society to take such a proper perspective on grades and don’t brush people off simply because they failed to make the grade – they may even be more intelligent than those who brush them aside.

To Jeffrey,
Thanks for your very thoughtful comments. I’m with you on many points.
My rejection of fine art and literature as academic subjects has to do with my belief (which I think is well justified) that these subjects, unlike real academic subjects like maths, physics, economics, history, are not concerned with the search of truth (i.e. to find out what the world is like in its logical, mathematical, physical, sociological, and religious realms). That’s the main reason for my view that fine art and literature are not academic subjects. It has nothing to do with the verifiability criterion of factual (synthetic) meaning. In fact, I reject the verifiability as well as the falsifiability criteria of factual meaning. These criteria cannot be used to distinguish science (as asserting something factually meaningful) from non-science (as asserting something factually meaningless), because even natural sciences cannot satisfy these criteria.
My reason for saying that fine art and literature are not academic subjects is simple: these subjects are not concerned with truth while real academic subjects are. This is sufficient to set fine art and literature apart from physics, maths, sociology, economics, history etc. When you read Shakespeare’s Hamlet, you’re reading a story invented by a famous author. You’re not trying to find out what is the fact of matter in the world (in its mathematical, logical, physical, sociological etc realms). Of course, if Hamlet contains a lot of information about the historical and cultural milieu of England and you’re mainly reading for the purpose of getting a better picture of the history and culture of Victorian (is it Victorian?) England while more direct and reliable historical accounts were unavailable, then I think your reading of Hamlet should not be seen as studying English literature but as part of your studies of the history of England. The same should be said of those who study Aristotle, Plato, and even ancient religious literature. They may say that they are studying literature. But I think these studies are academically valuable in virtue of the fact that they are studies of philosophy, history of philosophy, and theology, not in virtue of the fact that they are studies of literature. Apart from playing a role in providing materials for real academic subjects like history, sociology, philosophy, theology etc, literature does not have intrinsic academic value. So there is really no need for university programmes in literature insofar as Aristotle is studied in a philosophy course, the Old Testament in a theology course etc.
However, this does not mean that literatue has no role whatsoever in education. What I say is only that literature and fine art have no academic value if we understand the objective of academic subjects as the search for truth. If that is how we understand academic pursuit (i.e. the pursuit of truth), then we must say that the goal of education is broader than purely academic pursuit, given that the search for truth is not the only objective of education (though it is certainly one of its primary objectives). The acquisition of various skills and the the nurture of characters are other important goals of education. Thus there may be a case for studying some literature and fine art in primary and secondary education – it may help us develop some useful skills (e.g. in our use of language [but I’m a little bit sceptical about this too. It seems that the study of language subjects would be sufficient. It seems that most literature encourage bad epistemic {i.e. from the perspective of truth-seeking}practices, e.g. the use of exaggeration and wild association]).
When I say that most ‘real’ academic subjects share the common concern for truth, this doesn’t imply that truth is their only objective. Physics is not merely concerned with finding out what matter and energy are. It is also concerned about how to make things work in this world. Thus a vital part of science is (rightly) devoted to the development of technology (i.e. the production of useful tools and instruments). But in order to know how to make things work, one needs to know how things work in the world. Thus the instrumental objective of science depends on the epistemic (i.e. the truth-seeking) objective of science. I know there are some instrumentalist (or antirealist) philosophers and scientists who claim that the only purpose of science is to help us make tools that work, and that it doesn’t matter whether the theories that led to these technological results are approximately true or not just so long as these theories produce workable tools and results. There are good arguments against this instrumentalist view, which the space and context of this posting do not allow me to get into.
In short, given that real academic subjects are concerned with the search of truth (at least as one of their objectives) and that fine art and literature are not, the latter are not real academic subjects.

To Jeffrey,

I think what you wanted to say was that a deductively valid argument may be unsound (it does not make sense to say that an argument is true or false. A statement/proposition can be true or false. But an argument is valid/invalid, and sound/unsound). You’re surely correct that a deductively valid argument can be unsound.
In maths we are dealing mostly with deductive arguments/reasoning. In science, history, social science, etc, deductive logic is insufficient. The most important rule of reasoning in non-mathematical academic subjects and our ordinary life is inductive reasoning (which includes abduction).

What your second example shows is a case of (to use some technical terms in epistemology) true but unjustified belief. As what Plato argued (and continued to be defended by many current epistemologists), what we are after in our pursuit for knowledge are not simply true beliefs, but justified or warranted true beliefs. This is because one may end up with some true beliefs using non-truth-conducive means (e.g. irrational means, invalid inference, emotional sentiment). But the obtaining of these true beliefs is a matter of fluke or luck – it won’t lead to truth-conducive epistemic practice that will lead to the acquisition of mostly true beliefs in most situations in the long run, which are what we are after in our inquiry.

Logic (both deductive and inducitve) and scientific methodology are not fool-proof. Yes, they are imperfect. They will not lead to infalliable truths. But insofar as we are happy with approximate truths and mostly reliable scientific knowledge that grows and accumulates, logic and scientific methodology are the best tool we have in the pursuit of truth.

By the way, the truth of the generalisation in the major premise of your first example is the sort of thing that we can find out via empirical science through the use of inductive inferences. For example, we infer from observation and our background knowledge to some generalisation which may later be given the status of scientific law or theorem. Once established inductively as a scientific law or theorem, we can then deduce some specific observable predictions. This is a rough picture of how induction/abduction and deduction work in science. So I don’t see why science cannot give us the raw materials we need in deducing predictions. In any case, literature certainly cannot provide us with justified belief in or knowledge of your so-called raw materials (i.e. the truth of the premises one use in deducing scientific prediction).

No doubt imagination is essential in academic breakthrough. It is also true that there is some measure of creativity in literature and fine art. However, given that such a creativity can be cultivated in a much more productive and epistemically proper way through playing chess, puzzles, and bricks, and through solving mathematical problems and computer programming, I don’t see why we need literature and fine art to help us in this respect. Of course, literature and fine art are perhaps very good recreative activities. I have no problem at all for the use of these subjects for this purpose.
My main problem with literature is that it seems to promote bad epistemic practice: it encourages the use of exaggerated language and emphasise rhetorical aesthetic at the expense of objective, fair, and reasonable perspective and the clarity of thought.
I think a kind of literature where the aesthetic element is constrained within the bounds of good epistemic practice of clear, objective, precise, and logical thinking would be ideal. But even such a kind of literature will still have no academic value. However, it will at least be a better form of recreation.

Dear Jeffrey,

Thanks for these citations. Wow! You’ve got an impressive grasp of the literature!

As I said in an earlier comment, literature may provide some materials for real academic subjects such as history, philosophy, ethics, etc, as what your citations confirm. Insofas as one is reading literature for these purposes (history, philosophy, ethics etc), she is more properly seen as studying history, philosophy, ethics rather than studying literature. Apart from providing materials for these real academic subjects, literature has no intrinsic value as far as the academic objective of truth-seeking is concernedcon.

As my experience in reading convoluted and largely confused (as well as confusing) continental philosophy (an approach to philosophy that uses the style of literature) and theology influenced by continental philosophy shows, literature is a bad genre for serious academic discussion, be it philosophy, theology, history etc. We can do philosophy, theology, history etc a better service by the approaches that adopt methodology similar to those used in science. Therefore, this shows that even the limited value of literature (in providing materials for real academic subjects) is not that valuable after all.

I think it is important to distinguish between mere mention or reference to a certain subject and a serious study of (at least a small aspect of) that subject. Literature of course relates stories that raise issues in ethics, philosophy, and is set within some cultural and historical milieu. But I don’t think it is appropriate to treat Hamlet as a piece of serious ethics just because a character in that play does something that raises ethical questions or makes some remarks about ethics. Literature may be good material that provides some stimulation or create some awareness so that we begin to think about certain questions or at least begin to develop an interest in these questions. I don’t deny all these benefits. That’s why I say literature can be good and valuable recreation.
Having said that, we must not fail to see that when questions about ethics, philosophy, history, etc. are raised indirectly or touched on directly in a piece of literature, they are often mentioned or alluded to in passing, and in very loose, vague, inchoate, and many a time even incoherent form. They are good for creating awareness but cannot be seen as a piece of serious academic work that will help us to find out truth even about the metaphysical and ethical worlds. To find out truth about the metaphysical and ethical worlds, the best place to go is still serious articles and books of analytic philosophy, such as Loux, ed. Metaphysics: Contermporary Readings. London: Routledge.
Many literati claim that they are doing acadmemic work when they read/write fictions or plays that have some element of philosophy, ethics, politics, religion, history etc. But this only reveals the kind of low standards and lack of rigour they have about academic activity (and thereby dishonouring serious subjects like history, philosophy, theology, political science etc).
I don’t think these activities of the literati are academic at all. I cannot claim that I’m engaged in scientific studies if I watch a news programme that reports the discovery of a new planet. Mere reference to/mention of or allusion to a subject matter is very different from a serious study of that subject matter.

Thanks, Jeffrey, for this series of interesting discussions. I’ve enjoyed reading your very thoughtful postings!

I posted another comment on the problem of literature despite its involvement of some elements of philosophy, history, religion, politics, etc. about 20 minutes ago. But I wonder why that piece has not appeared while my three later postings have already appeared.

While I think it is irresponsible to pursue one’s passion when doing so renders him unable to make ends meet or support his family, we will not go far with an obsession with wealth, which is characteristic of many Chinese Malaysians.

If financial reward is the main motivating force driving so many of us into medicine, engineering, law, accountancy, it is little wonder why we lack real ingenious mathematicians, scientists, and thinkers that make significant contribution to pushing back the frontiers of human knowledge.

With so many practitioners and so few researchers, not to mention top-notch ones, our society won’t go far. Chinese are notorious for their narrow-mindedness and self-centredness. What we care the most is ‘my own financial security’, ‘my comfortable life’, and ‘my family’s income’, and will do everything to secure all these. With these self-centred considerations as our guiding principle, the choice between becoming a doctor and becoming a mathematician or a theoretical physicist is obvious.

If becoming a mathematician or a sociologist or research economist or a theoretical physicist means less income and less financial security than becoming a doctor, engineer, lawyer etc, there is no reason why we should not go for it.

And what’s wrong with someone who, because of his love for others and his passion to serve them, chooses to become a social worker, a pastor, or a teacher? Are they or their jobs less worthwhile just because they earn less than doctors, lawyers, or engineers? I’m very ashamed of the self-centredness and narrow-mindedness of my own ethnic group.

Nowhere in my previous comments did I suggest, as what Kingkong is trying to portray me as saying, that money is not important, or that the society does not need rich people. What I was referring to was an OBSESSION with wealth. I think Jeffrey’s excellent posting has said it all: passion and a sense of calling should be the primary motivating force and great financial reward may follow as a natural consequence.
I agree with Kingkong that it makes good sense to prioritise science subjects in Malaysia, given that it is still developing. But it’s high time to get more people into research. Where are all the financial resources for doing research? In UK, many scientific research projects are funded by industries that stand to gain from them. A substantial portion of taxpayers’ money has also gone into the allocations for various national research councils. Is Malaysia really so lacking in these resources? I don’t know, but it seems to me that much depends on what the government and the business tycoons prioritise. But I don’t think business tycoons and industrialists in Malaysia can afford to continue to fail to see the importance of the symbiotic relations between industry and research in this era of knowledge economy.
You can always cite some examples of generous Chinese businessmen in Malaysia and Singapore. But, as what Kingkong said earlier in relation to another point (we are talking about probability [or more precisely, statistical generalisation, rather than categorical exceptionless universal generalisations. Cf. All Chinese are XXX with Many Chinese are XXX, the latter of which was what I mentioned in an earlier comment]). Yes, there are always exceptions. There are always some exceptionally successful sportsmans, exceptionally successful AHSS graduates in developing countries, exceptionally successful businessmen who did not do well at school. But as what Kingkong rightly pointed out, they are exceptions. LIKEWISE, the citing of a few generous Chinese tycoons who have contributed to charities does not show that my remark that many Chinese Malaysians are narrowed-minded and self-centred in their obsession with wealth is unfair.

‘Don’t ever feel ashamed’ could be a very dangerous maxim. I’m sure this is the underlying principle that guided Samy’s response to the leakage issue. Kit Siang: ‘It’s incredible that there are so many problems after RM100 million worth of renovation. It brings shame to our country.’ Samy: ‘Nothing to be ashamed of! Leakage is normal. It happens in other countries too.’ ‘Don’t ever feel ashamed’ may also be the maxim that best explains Bung-Said’s behaviour and their subsequent responses to criticism. A sense of shame (when it is due) is very important to maintain our moral awareness. So I think I’m quite well justified in being ashamed of some undesirable features that characterise many Chinese Malaysians (note: I didn’t say ‘all…’).

“ One works (say) 7 hours a day, imagine not liking what one does, and in many cases hating and being stressed by what one does, —-substitute satisfactions that money could buy, appears to me to be a roundabout arduous way of trying to be happy but end up having poor health instead due to stress.

‘On the other hand if one has a liking and passion for one’s calling, one can put in the extra hours at home after work (when it is m music instead of drudgery), meet deadlines of work commitments to employers’ or customers’ satisfaction without the stress but the sense of pride and challenge of a work well done, where the hours spent in working (after working hours) are themselves a pleasure. “ –Jeffrey –

It is a fallacy to say that one who works with passion enjoys a better health than the one who does not. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, the great composer, passionate with his work died at an age of 35 on his piano. Dragon Lee, very passionate about his Kung Fu film died at about the same age. I would rather relate poor health with overwork whether it is work on passion or work on necessity. How one looks after one’s own health is the key.’ – Kingkong

I don’t think what Jeffrey says (as quoted by Kingkong) amounts to a claim that ‘one who works with passion enjoys a better health than the one who does not’. What Jeffrey says could be interpreted more charitably in this way: ‘ALL ELSE BEING EQUAL (i.e. given that all the relevant factors involved in one who works with passion and one who does not are the same, e.g. both have the same life style etc), one who works with passion enjoys a better health than the one who does not’. The qualifier ‘all else being equal’ is important and it pre-empts all Kingkong’s arguments againts Jeffrey on this point. True enough, those who take good care of their health are more likely to enjoy good health, whether they are passionate about their work or not. But this does not refute’s Jeffrey’s point, which can be interpreted as saying that, given that both (the passionate workers and the workers who have no passion) take good care of their health (and share other relevant factors), the passionate workers are more likely to enjoy good health than those who have no passion for their work. Given this charitable interpretation (and I think it is important to always take the most charitable reading allowed by the text), I think what Jeffrey suggests is very plausible. Of course, it is yet to be established statistically in empirical studies. But for the purpose of our discussion here, the general impression is good enough.
The ‘all else being equal’ qualifier derives from the principle of controlled experiment, without which one will not be able to exclude the interfering factors.

What is implied by one of Kingkong’s remarks is that one will not be happy if he needs money more than job satisfaction but chooses to work for more job satisfaction than monetary reward. There is a grain of truth here.
However, much depends on how you understand the ‘need’ of money. If it means whatever that is sufficient to support oneself and his family, I would say that the proposition of the implication is true. If, however, it means whatever that is sufficient for our quest for a luxurious life, then I’d say that that need cannot be satisfied and the process of satisfying that need may well lead to more dissatisfaction and miseries.
If one needs a lot of money to satisfy his desires for luxury, then he may not be happy even if such a need leads him to choose a job that offers more monetary reward than job satisfaction. This is because one will not be happy when his choice of doing something based on his need is made on the basis of the wrong assessment of his real need. One who thinks that he will be happy only if he lives a luxurious life because he thinks that a luxurious life is what he needs may be wrong (and thus still be unhappy even if he has chosen to do something in line with that perceived need), because human beings may be constituted (psychologically [and spiritually, if you do not hold a physicalist view]) in such a way that they are happier to enjoy what they do with passion (when doing so does not render them unable to make basic ends meet) than to enjoy an extravagant life.
Whether this is so we’ll have to look at what psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and theologians have to say. Can anyone enlighten me on this question: what do these scholars have to say about the question? I vaguely remember (but could well be wrong) that Abraham Marslow (a psycologist?) seems to support that view (i.e. human beings are so constituted that they are happier to enjoy what they do with passion when basic needs have been satisfied than to enjoy a luxurious life that goes well beyond basic necessities).

In short, satisfying real needs will bring more happiness than satisfying perceived but not real needs. So it is not true that someone who perceives that he needs money more than job satisfaction will be happy if he chooses to do something that will result in more money than job satisfaction. I vaguely remember (but could well be wrong) that Abraham Marslow (a pychologist?) seems to have found out in his studies that our real need (beyond basic material needs, which I interpret as an income that is sufficient to support oneself and one’s family) as human beings is a sense of self-actualisation (interpreted as job fulfilment in the contexts of most people) WHEN BASIC MATERIAL NEEDS HAVE BEEN SATISFIED. Those who perceive that they need a luxurious life well beyond basic material needs may thus be out of touch with their real needs (beyond basic material needs) of self-actualisation, which will bring them true happiness.
But as a Christian I’ll say that I believe that the highest level of satisfaction comes from one’s relationship with God. As Augustine says, ‘Thou O God hast made us for Thee, and our hearts are restless until they rest in Thee’. Of course, that is my religious conviction, which I think has very good philosophical justification. So I would say that self-actualisation is only the second highest level of happiness.

Thanks, Jeffrey, for this piece of information. Do you think that, when one’s basic needs have been satisfied, the real need will be job satisfaction rather than more money, much more beyond basic needs?

But I suppose you would think that the real need is job satisfaction when basic needs have been satisfied, and that this is true of most people (if Maslow is correct on this point).

You point is that, when passion and job satisfaction cannot be had simultaneously, one should opt for the choice that will lead to the satisfaction of the need that he thinks he needs the most (be it job satisfaction or more monetary reward).
I think this point is questionable given Maslow’s psychological studies that show that, when one’s basic material needs have been satisfied (which is the assumption all three of us base our arguments on), human beings are constituted such a way that their real need is higher level satisfaction, the highest of which is self-actualisation (interpreted as job satisfaction in most contexts). I’ve already provided detailed explanation of this argument, including the crucial distinction between perceived and real needs, which has already cast serious doubt on your point. You’ll have to argue against Maslow in order to get your point through.

The verfication/falsification and confirmation/disconfirmation of a general statement is not as simple as citing one counterexample, as you suggested. First of all, strict verfication and falsification apply only to analytic statements, which are what we deal with in mathematics. When you say that the citation of a counterexample should disprove a general statement (this is strictly speaking false, because general statement includes universal and statistical generalisations. You should have written ‘universal generalisation’, for a statistical generalisation cannot be falsified by a counterexample), what you have in mind is strict falsification, something we can only use in analytic statements (such as mathematical statements). But our discussions are on synthetic rather than analytic statements. When we are dealing with synthetic statements (e.g. emprical statements), strict verification and falsification do not apply. This has already been shown in the bankruptcy of logical positivism/empiricism. What we have are the notions of confirmation and disconfirmation, which correspond to (but is different from) verification and falsification. Philosophers of science have spent plenty of time to develop accounts of confirmation that could be applied to scientific statements in particular and empirical statements in general. One of these theories is Bayesian abduction. According to this theory, the disconfirmation of a hypothesis (making a general statement for example) is not the citing of a counterexample (that is falsification and cannot apply to synthetic/empirical statements), but has to take into considerations various criteria such as yielding the data, scope, simplicity, and fit with background theories.

Yes, ultimately everyone has to made her own choice. But that does not mean that every choice is rational. Making a choice without taking into considerations results of serious empirical studies (unless they have been shown otherwise) is a sign of irrationality. A builder is free to ignore the latest findings of engineering science and insists on his own gut feelings and choice. But he risks building something that may collapse. One is free to ignore the results of a careful psychological study and insists on his own gut feeling and choice, but doing so risks losing or failing to attain the well-being that could have been attained by taking those results into considerations.
Science and social science are not infallible. But experience tells us that they are reliable. This does not mean that every case of making a choice that ignores well-established theories will lead to troubles. But given the reliability of science and social science, one is more likely to live a better life by taking well-established scientific results seriously. Yes, psychology is still relatively less developed compared with hard sciences like physics and chemistry, but it is the best scientific channel we have in understanding human beings. In any case, it is more reliable than the pronouncement of Kingkong’s own gut feelings and what he asserts with certainty.