“117” will unveil the secret meaning of the most famous political prophecy in the country, “RAHMAN”???

“N” is the last alphabet: so whatever the outcome of “117” whether in favour or against BN, the fact that it is the last alphabet will, to BN’s detractors, either way forecast Najib Razak as the last sixth UMNO Prime Minister… :)

For the benefit of readers who are not subscribers of Malaysiakini, I reproduce below here the analysis o f todays KT by election by Dr Bridget Welsh, an associate professor in Southeast Asian studies at John Hopkins University-SAIS, Washington DC who is currently in Kuala Terengganu to observe the by-election:

(quote): “Tomorrow’s by-election represents a critical indicator for both the Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat. More than the August 2008 contest in Permatang Pauh and perhaps on par with the decisive turning point of Lunas in 2000, the contest of Umno’s Wan Ahmad Farid Wan Salleh and PAS’ Mohd Abdul Wahid Endut will be a key turning point in political fortunes of the incumbent government and opposition.BN: Campaigning from weaknessFor BN, severely weakened by the March 2008 polls, party infighting and lackluster leadership of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, the by-election will show whether the coalition can cooperate on the ground.

The Chinese 11.6% of the electorate will ultimately decide the election results. As such, the coalition needs to work as a unit to win. Unfortunately, this unity is missing. Umno leaders are focused on internal party dynamics and the racial rhetoric post-March 8 polls has left a negative imprint on Chinese voters. The Umno heir apparent Najib Razak has yet to instill confidence among non-Malay voters.The major Chinese component party in BN has also yet to win back its traditional electorate. The MCA is now riddled with infighting in the wake of its party polls and its new leader, Ong Tee Keat, has yet to move beyond his focus on his deputy to invigorate the party.More importantly, MCA has not yet shown that it can deliver for the Chinese in the current political environment of weakened BN. Many Chinese in Terengganu are leaning toward the opposition despite some of them being MCA members.The shadow of the losses of the BN in the March polls darkens its chances with non-Malay voters in this contest since none of the major issues associated with non-Malay representation been effectively addressed.

Ironically, since March 2008, the BN as a genuinely collaborative partnership of multi-ethnic parties has further eroded.This erosion in cooperation has corroded the BN electoral machinery. It was slow to get going in KT. It has gained momentum, but this may be too late to get enough of the BN supporters to the polls.The machinery is important, since the campaign to date has been essentially issue-less. The issues of the March polls continue to regurgitated. To win over the Chinese voters, BN has turned to the old and tried (read: tired) method of raising the hudud issue.This is old news, for an electorate fed up with the politics of fear. The BN negative messaging will only consolidate the die-hards and not extend multi-ethnic support.The BN has also turned to the traditional honed method of financial incentives. And the money has poured in as is the norm in by-elections, but the pace of distribution has not matched earlier efforts to date.Most flows, however, occur in the last day of polling, however, so this dimension is too early to call.

Irrespective, the problems of cooperation, machinery sluggishness and stale messaging hamper the BN’s chances.Both PM, Najib face key testPerhaps even more significant than the dynamics within BN, is the impact of this contest for Umno. KT represents a test of whether Umno can win a majority of Malay voters, whether the party is the legitimate voice of the Malay electorate.Traditionally polling shows that Umno has the support of anywhere from 35-65% of the Malays, but this dropped in March (and August) last year to under 50%. The drop was not that pronounced in

Terengganu, however, and recent polling by the Merdeka Center shows that the Malay electorate is evenly divided. Umno is quietly pushing the issue of Malay rights among its base and appealing to party loyalty. The party, however, is in a period of uncertainty. The cloud of the leadership transition and upcoming party elections have created a combination of lack of direction and factionalism.This factors have failed to engender enthusiasm and energy found in the campaigns of earlier by-elections such as Pendang (Kedah) and Anak Bukit (Kedah). Umno members are concerned with their own fortunes and not sure how much they should invest in this contest. Wan Farid’s link to Abdullah, the outgoing leader, has not brought in the support for those jockeying for future positions. The end result is that many Umno leaders are going through the motions. Leaders are making appearances, but not breaking a sweat for the cause.Without issues, the focus on the candidate has taken on greater significance. Despite Wan Farid’s valiant efforts to engage with voters in the campaign, these actions may be too little too late.Perceptions – which are unfair in that they do not appreciate his reserve – are that he is distant and arrogant.But perceptions can matter more than reality. Wan Farid has a reasonable record of public service and is not significantly tainted with scandal. This record ultimately may not matter, as the focus on shallow personality perceptions dominates talk in the coffee shops. If Wan Farid loses the contest, and Umno loses another seat, this will have a major impact. Foremost, it sends a signal to Abdullah that his own ally cannot win office. His power could be seen as completely evaporated, as his lame duck status has made him ineffective politically.Equally significant is that a loss will taint Najib, who has very much been the target of the opposition this round and the leader of the BN campaign effort. The hard work that Najib has put into this campaign will be moot, and he will now have two losses in his column as the leader apparent.

There is the real potential that some in Umno would question Najib’s leadership before the March 2009 party elections. Hard work only goes so far. It is the delivery that counts.The hand the BN had before the polls was weak, but it was very much of their own making, and has the potential to weaken further if the BN suffers a loss.Pakatan: Desperate to keep momentumFor the opposition, this contest is equally important.Like the 1989 Telok Pasu by-election during the period of Semangat 46, KT has the potential to bring the opposition together or divide it. If PAS loses this contest, this will potentially put pressure on Pakatan, as those unhappy with PAS working with Pakatan may become even more disgruntled.Those concerned that the coalition is hurting PAS’ viability as an Islamic party will gain ground, as many in PAS feel that the coalition is limiting their space to address issues of Islamic governance effectively.PAS took its time – as it does in its consensus decision-making – to settle on a candidate. The choice of Wahid Endut, a former civil servant and businessman, was carefully calculated. The party worked to smooth over differences within the party that emerged after March 2008 on how to work within the opposition.The two camps led by Syed Azman Nawawi and Mustafa Ali locally in Terengganu agreed on the choice of Wahid Endut, who is close to Mustafa but has the openness and credentials to appeal to the professionals in PAS and meet the standards requested of the other opposition component parties in Pakatan. It has been quickly decided that the candidate had to be local, and Wahid Endut fits that bill. His pluses were that he could also appeal to the civil servant community that comprise a large share of the KT electorate. PAS’ calculations rested on the assumption that they can hold their base and pick up some Chinese and Malay voters. This may not be as easy as it seems. PAS is divided about how it should govern – its position in Pakatan and its position on Islamic governance.While the decision to field Wahid Endut may have mended fences within the party, it is not completely clear whether this has extended to the KT electorate as a whole.The party has turned to its cache of bread-and-butter issues and threaded the campaign in its closed campaign meetings with promises of better governance, albeit undefined in form. Yet, with fuel prices much lower and economic conditions not perceived to be as difficult as last year, concerns with the economy have less appeal. The Islamic governance components remain abstract promises that have mixed appeal.Led by Hadi Awang, PAS in Terengannu has not fully appreciated that its message of Islamisation does not win over new voters, particularly in a middle-class constituency such as KT. PAS’ messaging this round is not new. The only new dimension is a targeted attack on Najib, which like the hudud issue, only serves to bring out the party faithful and not win over new voters.At the same time PAS’ machinery in Terengganu lacks the cohesiveness of that in Kelantan and arguably even Kedah. Modern posters and mobilisation has not yet replaced the traditional methods of in-house meetings and closed-door grassroots campaigning. The focus is on the fence sitters in quiet onslaught of material distribution.The resources that have characterised the campaign paraphernalia of PAS elections have not been matched in this contest, as the party appears taxed financially in presenting itself to KT voters. Without the same dynamism, it is not clear whether PAS is actually reaching new voters, which it needs to assure a win in this contest. Younger Malay voters will be decisive and in KT, they have leaned toward BN in both the 2004 and 2008 polls.Opposition cooperation as a whole will be essential. To date, the Pakatan has worked as a unit. Both PKR and DAP have brought in their leaders to assist, with PAS leading the campaign. The campaigning has been ethnically segmented – with DAP and non-Malay leaders in PKR addressing the Chinese while Anwar Ibrahim is focusing on the Malay community.Yet, the campaign cooperation reflects tightening bonds among opposition parties. The cooperation is pragmatic and does not address the ideological differences that divide the opposition, but the spirit of cooperation in the campaign is real.Unlike the BN, it is hampered by the fact that neither PKR nor DAP have their own independent base of support in Terengganu. DAP, for example, no where matches the local ties of MCA. The reality is that Pakatan has much less experience working together collaboratively than the BN and, at times, this inexperience shows.If PAS wins KT, the opposition as a whole will benefit. The victory will be seen as much a Pakatan victory as a PAS one since the spillovers will extend into the opposition congealing as a unit.The impact of a loss will have the opposite effect, and will send PAS inward-looking, with the potential of the message of deepening Islamic governance and widening this ideological opposition divide further. KT will determine whether the opposition gains momentum or backslides. The contest is PAS’ to loseMost pundits have argued that the poll is too close to call. With the national momentum working in the opposition favour, and the adjustments PAS made in their candidate selection, the contest is PAS’ to lose.PAS has the advantage, but the BN has been cutting into the contest over the last days of the campaign. Many of the electorate have already made up their minds and are staying home from the ceramah.The lack of enthusiasm in the capital of Malaysia’s richest east-coast state has not sparked the energy of other by-elections. KT voters know that their votes count, but neither side has given them strong reasons to come out and vote, especially swing voters.

Overall, the choice for KT voters is a negative one, the side they like least, rather than a positive vote for a particular party or candidate.Three factors will shape the final results – 1) turnout 2) mobilisation, and 3) the fairness of the contest.It is not the level of overall turnout that matters, but which groups – Chinese, Malay, older voters or middle-class voters – that will shape the outcome. Older voters will help the BN, for example, while the Chinese are likely to swing to PAS.Mobilisation is closely connected to turnout. Both sides will need to gear up their machinery with some stronger petrol than has been used to date in the campaign so far. The messaging of both sides is not inspiring.If the BN wins this contest, money will be a major reason. The key element will be whether both sides keep to the rules, from the potential use of phantom voters and intimidation to respecting the outcome. Tensions are high. The police presence is massive. Tomorrow will tell.” (Unquote)

Yes we’ll see what happens tonight.

Lets look at the idea of allowing individual states to have their own way to choose which stream of criminal law (Sharia & secular common law) they want. For this, lets make the hypothetical assumptions that (a) Kedah’s criminal laws for Muslims are Sharia, and Selangor, secular common law and (b) as far as rape offence is concerned, under Shariah, it is harder to prove the offence because of the requirement of the presence of 4 credible male witnesses of the offence.

Taking first the case where accused/offender and victims are both Muslims, and next where the accused/offender is a Muslim and the victim a non muslim.

Illustration 1: Muslim accused/offender from Selangor commits the rape on another Muslim victim in Kedah to take advantage of the ‘harder to prove’ Shariah law in Kedah.

Does the accused/offender get prosecuted by the more “relaxed” Sharia laws in Kedah based on where the offence is committed or the more stringent secular rape laws of Selangor from where the victim resides?

One may try resolve this Sharia conundrum by saying the law of where the victim resides should prevail.

Illustration 2: If that were so, sh should a (Muslim) rapist from Selangor be allowed to deliberately choose to commit the offence in Kedah on a Muslim victim residing in Kedah to take advantage of the more ‘relaxed’Sharia rape laws in Kedah?

Illustration No.3 : Wouldn’t the problems outlined in illustrations 1 and 2 above be compunded if the victim, whether residing in Selangor and visiting Kedah or residing within Kedah, were a non Muslim? Which law does one apply when the non muslim victim demands application of secular common law on rape, and the accused demand Sharia to which he says he is entitled?

Illustration 4 : Supposing the wrong doing is adultery which is a Sharia offence (Zina) punishable by death (decapitation). We have two offenders here, the Muslim alulterer from Kedah (sharia punishment is death) and the Muslim adulteress in Selangor (sharia punishment is a fine) or a Non Muslim for whom adultery is not a criminal offence. Supposing the adultery were committed in bo th Kedah and Selangor in different times. Do we put one adulterer to death by public decapitation and let the other scot free?

Illustration 5: even in deciding which law (Sharia or secular common law) to apply and which court – Sharia court or secular Court- to try each case – which should be the higher court to decide? A higher secular civil court or a higher Sharia Court?

The Constitution may permit states to promulgate Sharia laws but it is subject to these laws not being inconsistent with (a) Federal Law (eg Penal Code on crimes) or (b) constitutional protection of equality before the law or equal protection of the law encapsulated in articles 8(1) and (2) of the Federal Constitution.

The difficult part is which apex court (Sharia or secular) will decide on issues relating to (a) or (b) when a conflict in applications of between Sharia and secular law has arisen. Article 121(1)A (amendment introduced during mahathir’s administration) merely provides that jurisdiction of Sharia matters lies with Sharia courts, and civil, common law matters with secular courts but does not clarify whether if and when the two streams collide, which higher court, whether it be a Sharia or secular higher court, will determine the question whether the issue in contention ought to be referred to a Sharia court or a secular court below for adjudication.

By right it should be the secular Federal Court. So far it has skirted around this conundrum and not decided on it.

MOGADISHU, Somalia – A 13-year-old girl who said she had been raped was stoned to death in Somalia after being accused of adultery by Islamic militants, a human rights group said.Dozens of men stoned Aisha Ibrahim Duhulow to death Oct. 27, 2008 in a stadium packed with 1,000 spectators in the southern port city of Kismayo, Amnesty International and Somali media reported, citing witnesses.

She could not prove rape in the absence of 4 reliable male witness; at even 13 she could be married, and hence, having sex with a man other than her husband invoked inference of adultery puniushable by death by stoning.

“So, given the (seems to me) large amount of death and whipping already in the Penal Code, how is Hudud inconsistent with it?”

Penal Code is based on Common law precepts by which one of the cornerstone of crime is an infliction of harm on a third party without a lawful cause.

The element harm (on others) – that we see when an offender kills, maims, steals from, peddles drugs to others deserving whiping and death.

Hudud is structured around morality, with considerable focus on sexual morality. Even consensual, illicit sex in adultery, it is punishable by death though element of harm is absent unless one stretches it to include spouse’s emotions. What about youngsters petting in close proxibity? It is an offence though it inflicts no harm on any one. This is one difference, common law benchmarking a crime against harm to others whereas Hudud, harm against abstract concept of moralty, there being no or little difference between public and private morality.

Another difference is the patriarchal approach favouring males: veiling, men taking up to 4 wives, requirement of 4 witnesess whomust have seen the act to establish rape, in contrast to common law aspects relating to these issues.

The punishments in Hudud vary according to the status of the offender – Muslims generally receive harsher punishments than non-Muslims, free people receive harsher punishments than slaves, and in the case of zina’ (adultery), married people receive harsher punishments than unmarried.

Common law punishments vary according to whether offender is first offender or hardcore (concept of rehabilitation) – Hudud version is “only one hand should be cut off for the first theft” – or public interest where deterrence is required and other mitigating factors unrelated to religion (whether Muslim or non Muslim) or social status (free people vs slaves).

“Laws are just morals encoded, aren’t they?” – OrangRojak

Very much so in present Islamic Jurisprudence (Hudud) (or ecclesiastical laws of Medieval past) but not so, in the case of contemporary “secular law” derived from Common Law upon which Penal Code is based – that is, as I said, one of the main differentiating marks or inconsistent feature, if you will, distinguishing the Sharia Hudud from secular Penal Code.

Whilst some aspects of law overlap, as they invariably will, with morals, by and large and predominantly, the role of morals in secular constitution/societies is to provide aspiration for the community, marking what ought to represent the best practices, examples, ‘maximum’ conduct of its members, whereas secular law – especially criminal law – is (again generally not absolutely) predicated upon “harm to others”, which represents the ‘minimum’ conduct by which a member of community is expected to abide as an obligation and condition for living harmoniously with others.

One can say inflicting “harm to others” is “immoral”, and whilst that is true, the fact is conduct not inflicting harm but otherwise is amoral, morally neutral or even immoral, that does not inflict harm, is often, by secular law, not unlawful.

In contrast in the case of Sharia, in terms of “proportion” criminal law (hudud) and morality (viewed through Islamic prism) are very much fused, and laws encode morals.

One can understand this: In Islamic jurisprudence Hudud is part of laws the source of which is derived from the Almighty, whose concern includes morality of men’s behaviour.

In contrast, secular laws are made by men through their representatives in Pariament in resonance with Abraham Lincoln’s “government of the people, for the people and by the people” instead of of, for or by the Almighty!

And since men are characterised by their contrariety of political persuasions – as their moral persuasions – secular societies and constitutions would prefer predicating their criminal laws upon morally neutral benchmark of “harm” which is empirically verifiable rather than the relativism and subjectivity of “morals”.

On the other point – “If a group of people are determined to see their morals encoded as law and submit to them ….they should be permitted to, so long as nobody who does not give their full consent is subjected to those laws.”

It is not so here. Where or when does consent come in?

By constitution, the majority group are already defined to be Muslims by birth and leaving the faith is not permitted (re Lina Joy ‘s case) as apostasy is a crime which is punishable by death in regimes where Hudud is strictly enforced.

Even in the case of converts – once converted, it is irreversible because of the tenet against apostasy.