By Farish A. Noor

The verdict of history is still not out yet following the demise of General-turned-President Suharto. For all his achievements in putting his country on the map and leading Indonesia towards industrial development, Suharto’s human rights record remains one of the bloodiest in the post-colonial history of Southeast Asia, matched only by that of Ferdinand Marcos, who was likewise one of the great strongmen of Asia.

Suharto presided over one of the most spectacular socio-economic transformations in Asia of the 20th century: His nation of more than two hundred million souls was transformed over a period of three decades from a faltering post-colonial economy on the verge of bankruptcy to becoming one of the most attractive destinations for foreign capital investment. Yet the social and economic costs were high: Indonesia was sold as a source of cheap human labour and natural resources, to be exploited and plundered by foreign multinationals as never before. During this period normal political activity in the country came to a standstill; political parties were either disbanded or forced to merge; political dissidents were routinely harassed, silence and incarcerated, with hundreds more liquidated at will by the armed forces and security agencies of the state. The Indonesian press was stifled; students told not to enter the arena of politics; feudal structures were reinforced; while corruption was allowed to run rampant.

Even after he was deposed in May 1998 Suharto left office as one of the most corrupt leaders of the Third World, amassing wealth to the tune of billions of dollars that had been expatriated to foreign banks. Until today there is still no accounting of the exact extent and magnitude of his and his family’s corruption; and their collusion with the forces of capital and the army that kept this entire system of patronage and state violence intact for so long.

There are, however, some important lessons to be learned from this complex and often painful – and extended – episode of Indonesian history:

Suharto would never have been allowed to get away with his multiple abuses of power had he opted to keep Indonesia neutral during the Cold War, which was the preferred option of his predecessor Sukarno. It was Sukarno’s commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and his support of progressive anti-imperialist causes worldwide that aligned him to other outstanding Third World leaders like India’s Nehru. But Sukarno was accused by many of the governments of the West – notably the United States of America – as being too ‘soft’ on Communism for his attempt to keep the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the fold of national politics via the NASAKOM (Nasionalisme-Agama_Komunisme) alliance of the 1960s.

During the 1950s numerous Western governments regarded Sukarno in the same light as other anti-colonial Third World leaders such as Patrice Lumumba, and plans were made to remove him from the political stage altogether. When the young Indonesian republic was rocked by a series of internal civil conflicts, it was the USA that even supported some of the Islamist-fundamentalist successionist movements, mainly with the aim of toppling the Indonesian government.

Suharto performed a major u-turn by re-aligning Indonesia to the West and in particular the United States following the downfall of Sukarno in 1970. Since then it was the US that was Indonesia’s staunchest ally, supporting Suharto in his ‘battle against Communism’ when Southeast Asia was declared ‘the second front’ in the ‘war on Communism’. (Very much like how the ASEAN region today is described as ‘the second front’ in the ‘War on Terror’.

Suharto’s close relationship to the governments and corporations of the West guaranteed that he and his generals and cronies were able to command and rule the country at will, and it was this that allowed the Indonesian army to march into East Timor in 1974 to forcibly annex the country. Yet while the massacre of East Timorese civilians was taking place, Washington and its allies were more vocal in their condemnation of human rights abuses taking place in the Soviet bloc. Needless to say, had Suharto sided with the Russians then, he would have been put in the same category of ‘Communists dictators’ like Tito instead, and duly dealt with.

This is the first lesson that was learned by the dictators of ASEAN since the 1960s and the rise of American global power: That one can rule one’s country with an iron fist and pay scant regard to human rights as long as you are on the side of Uncle Sam and the good ‘ol USA. Marcos understood this, as did South Vietnam’s despot Bao Dai. Today the same lesson has been learned by a host of American crony-puppets all over the world.

The second lesson is that the atrocities that take place in any ASEAN country can be carried out as long as there is no dissent from your neighbors who can be persuaded to look the other way. The great tragedy of Indonesia during the 1970s-1990s was that while the country was being robbed and pillaged by its own leaders, the leaders and governments of ASEAN stood still and said nothing. If Indonesia today is plagued by a host of problems ranging from religious militancy to chronic economic failure and massive unemployment (which in turn leads to other pan-regional problems like the illegal migration of Indonesians to neighboring countries) then it is partly because the other countries of ASEAN did not see fit (or had the moral courage) to say anything. ASEAN is as much at fault for Indonesia’s crisis now as Suharto was, and we – the citizens of ASEAN – have to bear the blame and responsibility too.

Now that Suharto is gone, our focus turns to the military junta in Burma and their brutal suppression of their own people. Once again, ASEAN governments are turning a blind eye to what can only be a major diplomatic and regional crisis in the near future. Yet will we take the lessons of Suharto’s mistakes (and ours) to heart? Or will we once again do nothing, and by doing so pay the price and commit the sin of passive neglect and negative responsibility?

End.