///Radzi should ensure that his committee’s report is tabled in Parliament first thing on Monday/// – YB Kit.

Go easy on Radzi a bit, it is not within his power to so ensure – it’s the PM. His Special Committee makes annual report to PM – he has done his part on that -and it’s PM who reports it to Parliament. It’s probably delayed at political/PM’s level. Which is not surprising because it was earlier leaked to press that Radzi’s Special committee would ask for (i) prosecutorial powers independent of Public Prosecutor/AG and (ii) additional funding (ouch!, this time when govt gives impression its short in funding allocation).
Cut him Radzi some slack because out of the 3 ‘oversight’ committees – the Advisory, Special and Complaints Committees in MACC set up- Radzi’s Special Committee is the ‘hottest’ and most difficult because of two reasons/probelms, firstly, institutional weakness of MACC under MACC act and secondly tendency of govt/politicians in 3rd world countries, enmeshed in feudal patronage culture, to use anti corruption agency for political purposes of perpetuating/preserving power than its avowed purpose of eradicating corruption, placing the Special Committee in charge of accountability under stress.

Touching on these 2 reasons/problems:
Firstly Radzi’s Special Committee is caught in between the MACC operating side & the other Advisory & Complaints Committees, not to mention the PM’s side.

The MACC operating side headed by MACC Commissioner reports to Radzi’s Committee about its current investigations and problems (including staffing & operating costs).
Radzi’s Special Committee has no power under the MACC Act to tell MACC Commissioner what to do to hurry up on investigations esp on the big sharks.
When faced with demands for more financial resources, he relays request to PM but the government may not entertain. Indeed he gives his report to PM’s office but if PM delays in presenting annual report to Parliament, Radzi “kena” from Kit on why the delay. Then the Advisory Committee, which has civil society’s representation in people like Ramon Navaratnam, Robert Phang and Simon Sipaun, relays its complains through Radzi’s Committee to the govt that MACC could not, after Teoh Beng Hock (TBH)’s death in MACC’s and the flip flop decision of quizzing of PI Bala in London episode operate with public confidence without major upliftment of image by addressing these issues. TBH will fall under purview of the other Complaints Committee in charge of overseeing MACC Commission’s of handling of public complaints of misconduct of “non criminal nature” (per the MACC Act). Both TBH’s & Altantuya/PI Bala cases are “criminal” in tone so the Complaints Committee will tell Radzi to convey to PM/Govt that it has no power to tell MACC Commissioner what to do for these 2 cases to enhance public confidence!
When Radzi’s Special Committee asks for funding, he gets a blank stare from the govt – and an adverse reaction from the public demanding what’s the difference!
Anti Corruption operations (with spies etc) need lots of funding. Hong Kong’s ICAC asked for US$90 million; it got it because public supported such funding having regard to ICAC’s track record. In contrast MACC’s record so far is catching ikan bilis than ikan yu, besides car and cows, so public support for more financial allocation is absent! Its chicken & egg problem!

The other problem is the way anti corruption agency could be “manipulated” for political purposes if sincerity were lacking to tackle corruption.

When ruling elites perceive vulnerability to electoral disadvantage and defeat due to public outrage against rampant corruption, they would generally publicize how they are committed to eradicating this social/economic cancer by instituting by legislation a so called strong anti corruption agency.

It is basic that the anti corruption agency instituted is intended to buttress public support for their continued rule and governance – NOT undermine it.

However if the anti corruption agency really sincerely does its job and given all necessary independence not to mention financial resources, some politicians and their cronies in power will also get caught like Sharks, whales or Ikan Yu (whatever you call them) along with ikan bilis in the Anti corruption Net – the effect of which is to undermine more the public and electoral support for the ruling elites and their parties. This will never be allowed to be. From ruling elites’ perspective sincere and determined effort by anti corruption agency defeats the first principle why they institute it!

So the game plan is (1) to make the anti corruption agency not really independent but beholden in its decisions to the powers-that-be (2) under-resource it and (3) emphasize more the public relations part of the Advisory committee to educate the public on evils of corruption to show commitment whilst on operational side, make sure the investigations are selective, dependent on Executive’s influence and independent of the other ‘oversight’ committees’ interference.

At the end of the day it is the committee in charge of accountability/reporting (Radzi’s committee) that will receive the public ire/heat and be scapegoat when it gets caught-in-between these behind the scenes games and manoeuvres to use the anti corruption agency to shore up public/political image and support and yet not doing the real work it is tasked.

In hindsight, the MACC Act (“Act”) should be tightened with more checks and balances. From lessons drawn from delay it occurs to me that we should look into seven areas.

First: by MACC Act, Radzi’s Special Committee submits annual report to PM who shall lay a copy of that with Parliament -section 14(5). No time is prescribed when PM has to do it. Also no rationale why annual report has to go through PM as conduit before it gets laid in Parliament. Why can’t annual report be presented by Special Committee to both PM & Parliament at same time or if not a least a time period be stipulated regarding when PM should lay a copy of it in Parliament?

Secondly you may want to consider supporting Radzi’s proposal for MACC to have independent prosecution power instead of having to depend on Public Prosecutor’s discretion and consent required under present section 58. Let MACC have its own prosecution team (like in Indonesia) to prosecute corruption cases in stances where independence is required most ie cases involving Division 1 & 2 Civil service, upper echelons of security services and regulatory agencies and high profile corporate figures. If Public Prosecutor, in these Ikan Yu cases, do not prosecute within 2 months of its receipt of MACC’s investigation papers and recommendation to prosecute, MACC should be empowered to independently prosecute if its Special & Advisory Committees give the approval to do so provided that the AG/Public Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with prosecution is not backed by a convincing and irrefutable point of law/fact why the Prosecution’s case cannot hope to stand in Court of Law.

Thirdly, of all the MACC’s oversight Committees, the more important one is the Special Committee of Radzi – by the Act to be filled up by representatives from Dewan Rakyat & Negara. You can insert an amendment that requires mandatory Opposition members representations in this Committee. Also this Committee’s job is merely to compile annual report to PM from reports given from MACC’s Commissioner representing operational/enforcement side.

Fourthly the Special Committee is presently empowered to only ask MACC Commissioner for reports and clarifications but has no power to direct MACC what to do on investigations. In tandem with 2nd suggestion above to vest MACC Commissioner with independent power to prosecute in ‘Ikan Yu’ cases, the powers of Special Committee should be widened to direct – and not just seek clarifications and reports from – MACC Commissioner on what to do in certain high profile cases. Other wise what so “special” about this Special Committee ???

Fifthly, the Public Complaints Committee is currently straddled by its monitoring of public complaints against MACC being confined to misconduct of MACC’s officers of NON-criminal nature. That will straightaway knock out cases like Teoh Beng Hock’s death within MACC precincts of a possible criminal complexion. Oversight should include complaints of criminal nature against MACC’s own officers.

Sixthly, protect and shield MACC’s Commissioner’s position from political pressure by requiring his tenure of contract, like a judge, that cannot be ended except in cases of grave misconduct or unlawful behaviour.

Finally give more funding for MACC.