YB Kit,

Pakatan Rakyat is a electoral coalition. It is a just a collection of parties that do not compete independently in an election (against each other) but as a united front against the incumbent coalition.

The rationale for forming such an electoral coalition is grounded on the basic rationale that the coalition is beneficial to maximise chances of defeating incumbent coalition (BN), and that had there been no coalition, neither of the three parties running alone, nor even two of the three coalescing, without the third, would have any chance.

The preceding rationale is the fundamental prerequsite of the formation and subsistence of the coalition.

It is of course ideal if the component parties are, at the same time, ideologically compatible, ie if as what Lee Wang Yen says, DAP breaks off and there are other moderate parties to join to meet the above prerequisite. However if there are no foreseeable prospects of other parties joining, why does one do? Breakaway when alone or even two of the three coalescing, without the third, would provide no chance?

Unless there is a good chance, this cannot be.

So you carry on in a coalition of ideologically incompatible parties. On pure logical grounds, Ong Tee Kiat (OTK)’s accusation – that the DAP supports Hudud/Islamic state by reason of support for PAS KT by election candidate – can be rebutted by the fact that the prerequisite of the coalition is as stated above, and not ideological compatibility, and you have shown that by publicly distancing DAP from Husam’s statement on Hudud, which should suffice.

It has to be clarified that what I have stated in preceding posts is soley from the coalition’s point of view – to wrest power via constitutionally mandated ballot box on the assumption that in politics the first objective is power, the second only to be seen exercising it with proper governance, acountability, equitable fairness an democracy.

From rakyat’s point of view it is at all times a reversal : proper governance, acountability, equitable fairness an democracy come first. It is country’s welfare first, not just power from evicting incumbent.

However they are entitled to think that an election coalition that wins will also become a government coalition bringing into government th eir disparate ideologies as spoils of victory.

So if they perceive that this electoral coalition presents a perfect opportunity and platform for PAS to make significant advances of its theocratic agenda as evinced by tolerance by the other two co alition partners of PAS’s repeated breaches of the common understanding/manifesto of PR, to the extent that it will likely become a reality upon electoral victory by PR coalition with PAS i n dominat position – and if further if they think that a moribund, racist or corrupt incumbent government is actually a lesser evil than the Islamic theocratic state – then, they will support the incumbent government.

If however they think:

· A Islamic theocratic state is still better than a corrupt incumbent government; or

· Even if they don’t think so that a theocratic state is better, and for so long that they further think PAS cannot so easily form an Islamic theocratic state when PR secures electoral victory because of demograpics, internal opposition from its coalition partners and also external resistance from BN’s parties (in a Parliamentary Opposition then ), NGOs and civil society,

then they will tend to be blase about PAS challenges and will support PR in spite of PAS.

I hope this clarifies some of the issues in contention.

“I put to you that this, on a cumulative basis, is what the majority thinks. This is why PR can win, and PR can rule as an alternative to BN.” – Godfather (Yesterday at 23: 11.54)
Let see the validity of that “put”:

1. “What the majority thinks?” It is certainly what you or perhaps the majority of some of the more vociferous commenters in this thread think or would like to think. I do not know whether that is what the majority of readers/visitors here (many of whom have not left their comments) think, much less the majority of what rakyat/voters think.

2. “This is why PR can win, and PR can rule as an alternative to BN” – this depends on what the majority of what rakyat/voters think per 1. and other factors ie whether PR could deliver or can still hold together and not be torn by open dissension by next election on the assumption that BN cannot re-invent;

3. Even if the majority think either (a) Islamic theocratic state is still better than a corrupt incumbent government; or (b) PAS cannot so easily achieve its end agenda of an Islamic state (whether solely through PR coalition platform or using the opposition platform leap unto the BN platform), it does not necessarily mean that majority is definitely right in its assessment.

However lets look at the question : whether the distinction between an electoral and aruling coalition is “real” or crucial enough on realistic grounds to stand. This is really what Lee Wang Yen questions.

The answer to that (arguing on pragmatic grounds) is (frankly) not a straight forward one of yes or no.

In a sense, Lee Wang Yen’s questioning is entirely legitimate. If my distinction (between electoral coalition and ruling coalition) were intended to imply that an ideologically divided electoral coalition can easily, on electoral victory, make the transition to an effective ruling coalition, then that is wrong. Ideologicaly differences cannot disappear overnight : indeed they are likelier exacerbated in victory when sharing power (the ultimate objective) becomes imminent or realised. This is especially so when the parties to PR coalition are only 3, arguably of equal power and voters pull. They may squabble and fall apart.

But one may ask (also on pragmatic grounds) will above scenario definitely happen?

As at now Anwar cannot get a single BN (non-UMNO) party to cross because they follow who they think is winner. The moment they sense PR would win or PR has already won, do you think they won’t join PR ruling coalition with alacrity diluting, as I said in the past, PAS’s influence and dominance necessary for it to assert its theological agenda within the ruling coalition?

As has been pointed out, we h ave a constitution (not in line with PAS’s ideology), NGOs, Civil Society, PKR & DAP as well as whatever left of BN in the opposition then : is it so easy for PAS to assert/realise its ag enda in light of existing realities of Malaysia’s demographics?

Again we return here to possibilities versus probabilities which Lee Wang Yen has highlighted in the past. Is it so probable that PAS will get its objective?

This has to be balanced against three reality check:

1. taking experience of other opposition electoral coalition elsewhere how many of these have ideological compatible parties? (Here one is permitted to lok at “degrees” of incompatibility. We cannot refute that PAS’s ideological difference with the other two is as wide as between North and South poles);

2. if DAP were to break off now who would join it in the PD? It is chicken and egg: they join when DAP evince chance to win. They don’t join so easily to h elp DAP break off from PAS to win. Otherwise they would, on Anwar’s overtures, have already joined PR by now!

3. the other consequence of 2., is that the prospect of change of BN immediately recedes, all gains on March 8th will be wiped out, and it i s not easy to t hink that this is the better way forward for the country. If PR is allowed to win by staying together, then at least there is a chance for the dangers of PAS’s theocratic state to be mitigated by dilution as I said earlier.